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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES LEROY HOPKINS, 
) 
. 
) Case No. 
9338 
) 
Defendant and Appellant,) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 22, 1960, police officer 
Archie Bukosky subscribed and swore to a 
criminal complaint against appellant, a 
negro. Appellant was charged with having 
committed the crime of burglary in the 
second degree in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 9, Section 3, and with being an 
habitual criminal under Title 76, Chapter 
1, Section 18, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
(R.4). A warrant for the arrest of appellant 
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was issued the same day by Judge Maurice 
D. Jones of the City Court of Salt Lake 
City, Utah (R.3). 
Following preliminary hearing on 
May 23, 1960, appellant was ordered bound 
over to the District Court for trial on 
both charges of the complaint (R.2). 
Trial was had on July 7, 1960 (R.9). In 
the information executed by Jay E. Banks, 
District Attorney for the Third Judicial 
District, Salt Lake County, Utah, appellant 
was accused of the crime of burglary in the 
second degree in that on the 18th day of 
April, 1960, in the County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, appellant entered the 
apartment of Della McBreaty in the night-
time with intent to commit larceny therein, 
and of being an habitual criminal (R.S). 
The allegation of habitual criminality was 
subsequently stricken from the information 
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(R. 10-11). The evidence adduced by 
respondent at trial was to the effect 
that on the morning of April 18, 1960, a 
Mrs. Dorothy Garnett occupied apartment 
number three at 803 Park Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah (R. 34, 36); that her 
apartment was directly beneath that of 
Mrs. Della McBreaty (R. 62-63); that 
there were three other units in the 
apartment house, one north of and on the 
ground floor with that of Mrs. Garnett, 
one north of and on the second floor with 
that of Mrs. McBreaty, and one in the base-
ment with its entrance on the south side 
of the building (R. 35-37); that all five 
apartments were occupied that morning 
(R. 63-64); that there was a front entrance 
on the west side of the building leading 
into a hall which lead to the apartments 
of Mrs. Garnett and Mrs. McBreaty (R. 37); 
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that there was a rear entrance on the 
east side of the building to the apart-
ments of l·h.·s. Garnett and Hrs. HcBreaty 
(P~.3); that prior to sun up on the 
morning of April 18, 1960, Mrs. Garnett 
was either awal<:ened (R. 50) or had been 
awake all night (R. 60-61) and heard 
noises in the front hall and at the rear 
of the building (R.39); that she looked 
out the living room window facing west 
and saw a white man standing there (R.39); 
that she then loolced out the dining room 
window facing south and saw a colored man 
on the balcony on the building to the 
south (R.40)~ that she then saw cl1e 
colored man drop a ladder from the 
balcony and a minute later she saw the 
ladder placed on the roof of the entrance 
to the basement aparoment, directly beneath 
a window in Nrs _ McBreatv' s apartment (R.l~l); 
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that she then saw someone ascend the ladder 
(R.42) but saw only the person's legs (R.58) 
or feet (R.62) and further saw nothing 
distinguishing about his feet (R.61); 
that she then called the police (R.58); 
that during all this while a one hundred 
watt bulb was burning in Mrs. McBreaty's 
living room (R. 67-68) with the living 
room drapes open (R.68); that nothing 
was stolen (R.73); that Mrs. McBreaty had 
not known that anyone was in her aparbment 
until the police so informed her (R. 71-72); 
that Mrs. McBreaty was awakened by the 
arrival of the police (71-72); that Mrs. 
McBreaty's husband was in Tooele County 
that night (R.63); that Mrs. McBreaty's six 
daughters, all less than eight years of age, 
were asleep in one of the bedrooms of her 
apartment (R. 63, 72); that the front and 
back doors to Mrs. McBreaty's apartment 
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were locked during the night (R. 64-65) but 
that the rear door was open when she awoke 
(R.66); that Mrs. McBreaty had given no 
one permission to be in her apartment 
(R.71); that the first police officer to 
arrive saw a colored man standing in front 
of the dining room window of Mrs. McBreaty's 
aparament (R. 76); that the police found 
a pair of shoes belonging to appellant 
(R.77); that an hour or so later, the 
police apprehended appellant walking east 
on Ninth South Street between Fifth and 
Sixth East (R. 82); that appellant told 
them he was going to visit a friend named 
Maggie (R.83); that appellant admitted to 
the ownership of an Oldsmobile automobile 
parked on Park Street (R.87); that appellant 
was later interrogated at the Public 
Safety Building in Salt Lake City (R.lOO) 
at which time he first denied and then 
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admitted ownership of the shoes that had 
been found (R.97); that he was later 
interrogated at the city jail (R.l03) 
and that appellant then told the interrogat-
ing officer that he had b~en driving south 
on West Temple Street about three o'clock 
A.M. and washailed.by a white man for a 
ride home; that appellant offered to give 
the white stranger a ride in exchange for 
$2.00 worth of gasoline; that the stranger 
bought th~ gasoline and appellant drove the 
stranger to his Park Street destination; 
that the stranger tried to get in Mrs. 
McBreaty's apartment but discovered the 
doors locked; and that the stranger then 
requested appellant's aid with the ladder 
(R. 98). There was other evidence adduced, 
hereinafter to be mentioned. 
At the close of respondent's evidence, 
appellant moved the court for an order dis-
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missing the action on the grounds of 
insufficiency of the evidence (R.109). 
This motion was denied (R.l09). 
Appellant did not testify in his 
own behalf. The case was submitted to the 
jury, which returned a verdict of guilty 
(R.ll9}. From judgment on the verdict, 
this appeal is prosecuted. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The sole issue raised herein is: 
The evidence adduced by respondent was 
insufficient at law to sustain a conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY RESPONDENT WAS 
INSUFFICIENT AT LAW TO SUSTf~IN A CONVICTION. 
Appellant was tried and convicted of 
burglery in the second degree under an 
information which stated that on the 18th 
day of ~pril, 1960, in the County of Salt 
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Lake, State of Utah, appellant entered 
the apartment of Della McBreaty in the 
nighttime with intent to commit larceny 
therein (R.S). The elements of the 
offense as stated in the information were 
in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 
76-9-3 (1953). 
It is axioma:~i~ that "intent, being 
a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of 
direct proof, but ordinarily must be in-
ferred from the acts and conduct of the 
party and the facts and circumstances 
attending them which reasonably indicate 
them to the minds of others.n 9 Am. Jur. 
Burglary§ 61. In other words, intent 
must ordinarily be proved by circum-
stantial evidence. With respect to ·cir-
cumstantial evidence in criminal prosecu-
tions, th~ general rule is as follows: 
-10-
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"l-'lhere circumstantial evidence is 
relied upon in a criminal prosecu-
tion, proof of a few facts or a 
multitude of facts all consistent 
with the supposition of guilt is 
not sufficient to warrant a verdict 
of guilty. In order to convict a 
person upon circumstantial evidence, 
it is necessary not only that the 
circumstances all concur to show that 
~he prisoner co~~itted the crime and 
be consistent with the hypothesis of 
guilt, since that is to be compared 
with all the facts proved, but that 
they be inconsistent with any oth~r 
rational conclusion and exclude 
every other ~easonable theory or 
hypothesis except that of guilt . 
A reasona~le doubt must be resolved 
in favor of the accused \Jhere a fact 
or circumstance is susceptible of two 
interpretations. If the circumstances 
tending to show t:1e guilt of the accused 
are ns consistent \vi th his innocence 
as with his guilt, they are insufficient. 
In order to convict a person of a 
crime, the facte m1jSt be inconsistent 
with, or such as to exclude, every 
reasonable hypothesis or theory of 
innocence. . . . The weight of cir-
cumstantial evidence is a question 
for the jury to determine; such 
evidence alone or in connection with 
other evidence may justify a conviction. 
Great care, however, must be exercised 
in ~rawing inferences from circum-
stances proved in criminal cases, and 
mere suspicions will not warrant a 
conviction." (20 .Am.Jur.Evidence § 1217) 
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This has long·been the law in 
Utah. In State v. Wells, 35 Utah 400, 
100 Pac. 681, 684 (1909), this court 
stated: 
"But, as in all cases of circum-
stantial evidence, not only must 
circumstances be established which 
agree with and support the hypo-
thesis which they are adduced to 
prove, and concur to show the 
defendant's guilt, but they must 
also be inconsistent with any other 
reasonable conclusion. It is not 
enough that circumstances be 
proven from which an inference may 
be deduced that the production of 
the miscarriage was not necessary 
to preserve the life of the woman, 
but they must also be inconsistent 
with every other reasonable con-
clusion. 'The conclusion is not 
supported by circumstantial evidence, 
unless the facts relied on are of 
such a nature, and so related to 
each other, that no other conclusion 
can fairly or reasonably be drawn 
from them, and this requirement is 
strictly enforced, where decisive 
direct evidence is probably attain-
able, but is not produced.' 17 Cyc.817.u 
Thus, restating the law with respect 
to this case, the evidence adduced by res-
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pondent with respect to d~fe~dant's 
intent to commit larceny is insufficient 
if the evidence is consistent with any 
other reasonable conclusion. Furthermore~ 
no jury question arises liif the evidence 
is such that reasonable men would not 
differ upon. the fact that it includes" 
a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. 
State v. Burch, 100 Utah 414, 115 -P.2d 
911, 912 (1941). In such a case nit is 
not a question for the jury, but is one 
for the court." State v. Burch, sup-:-a. 
Defendant submits that the evidence 
adduced in this case is consistent with a 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and 
that therefore the court -below erred in 
submitting the case to the jury and in 
not granting defendant's motion to dismiss. 
-13-
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Several facts which are inconsistent 
with the hypothesis of guilt make this 
hypothesis immediately suspect. ~fuy 
would a burglar attempt to burglarize 
a second story apartment with a one hun-
dred watt bulb burning brightly therein? 
There was no showing at the trial that 
Mrs. HcBreaty's apartmeht contained any-
thing of especial value, and, indeed, the 
showing was to tqe contrary (R. 68-69); or 
that entrance to. the ground 'floor O!:' base-
ment apa~tments was net equally as ~ccess• 
ible or even more accessible than it was 
to Mrs. McBreaty' s apartment. tfuy 
would a burglar att~mpt to burglarize an 
apartment on a lighted street (R.40 ,l~6) Y 
Why would a burglar attempt to gain access 
to a well lighted second story apart~ent 
first through the conventional front 
-14-
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and rear entrances? This approach is 
fraught with the danger of discovery 
because of a creaky staircase, a squeaky 
door or a vigil insomniac. There was no 
evidence to show that defendant knew or 
thought Mrs. McBreatyvs apartment was 
empty. To the contrary, the evidence 
showed that Mrs. McBreaty and her six 
young daughters were home. If burglary 
had been the object of appellant's visit, 
why was there no sho"~Zving that the man in 
the front hall had attempted to open Mrs. 
Garnett's front door, whereby escape would 
have been much easier had the would-be 
burglar been detected? Why was there no 
showing of the results of the fingerprint 
tests run on Mrs. McBreaty's purse which 
was lying right in front of the living 
room window (R.69) and would naturally 
-15-
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be the first thing a burglqr would 
grab? These facts all tend to indicate 
that larceny was not the purpose of 
appellant's visit. 
On the other hand, the undisputed 
facts in this case are that there was 
a whit~ man present with appellant on 
the morning of April 18, 1960, at 803 
Park Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
that appellant drove this man to said 
address pursuant to hi& request and 
having been informed that it was the 
stranger's home, and that the stranger 
asserted his right to make entry (R.98). 
Such undisputed facts certainly do not 
prove and in fact tend strongly to dis-
prove the existence of the requisite 
criminal intent. In the absence of 
proof of ~ ~, appellant is innocent 
-16-
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as a matter of law. S~ch undisputed 
facts are in every way consistent with a 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. 
Appellant submits that he is the 
victim of circumstances, or, more 
accurately, of circumstantial evi~ence 
which on ~areful examination reveals quite 
clearly that he did not enter Mrs. McBreaty's 
apartment on the morning of April 18, 1960~ 
and irt the nighttime with intent to steal. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence adduced in this case 
is consistent with a reasonable hypothesis 
of innocence. Therefore, the court below 
erred in submitting the case to the jury 
-17-
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and in not granting defendant's motion 
to dismiss. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Earl M. Wunderli 
Attorney for appellant 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
-18-
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